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This paper, largely based on Genicot and Ray (2003), discusses group formation in the
context of informal insurance arrangements with enforcement constraints.
1.1. Risk-Sharing Agreements. Risk is a pervasive fact of life for most people, especially
so in developing countries. A high and often extreme dependence on volatile labor markets or
agricultural production, widespread poverty, and the lack of access to formal insurance and credit
serve to create a particularly acute problem of consumption smoothing. It is not surprising, then,
that formal insurance arrangements are supplanted by widespread informal arrangements. Such
arrangements are not based on contracts that are upheld by a court of law but on the implicit
promise of future beneﬁts from continued participation and its attendant mirror image: the threat
of isolation from the community as a whole in the event of noncompliance.
It hardly needs mentioning that there is considerable evidence of mutual insurance in village
communities (Morduch (1991), Deaton (1992), Townsend (1994), Udry (1994), Jalan and Raval-
lion (1999), Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002), Grimard (1997), Gertler and Gruber (2002),
and Foster and Rosenzweig (2002)). What is more interesting is that the same studies reveal a
large departure from the ideal of perfect insurance. It is only natural to invoke various incentive
constraints to explain the shortfall. Asymmetry of information, moral hazard and the lack of
enforceability are all potential impediments to widespread risk-sharing.
Of these three factors, it appears that the most important constraint arises from the lack of
enforceability of risk-sharing agreements. Udry (1994), for instance, ﬁnds this constraint to be
the most important in describing the structure of reciprocal agreements in rural northern Nigeria.
In the absence of explicit, legally binding contracts, these agreements must be designed to elicit
voluntary participation. This constraint often seriously limits the extent of insurance informal
risk-sharing agreements can provide.
Posner (1980, 1981) was the ﬁrst to posit that voluntary risk-sharing can emerge between
self-interested individuals if future reciprocity is expected. Following his insight, there has been
a growing body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, on self-enforcing risk-sharing agree-
ments. Some important theoretical contributions are Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993),1. INTRODUCTION 3
Kocherlakota (1996), Kletzer and Wright (2000), and Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002). All
these studies deﬁne self-enforcing agreements as those that are proof from noncompliance by
individual members of the group.
1 According to the theory, the individual defector is isolated
from the community, so that he must self-insure. With this insight in place, the common practice
in the literature has been to deﬁne self-enforcing risk-sharing agreements as subgame perfect
equilibria of a repeated game (in which self-insurance is always an option), and to characterize
the Pareto frontier of such equilibria.
This kind of analysis has two important consequences. First, large groups always do better
than smaller groups. Hence, eﬃcient agreements have to be at the level of the “community”.
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This is why most empirical tests of insurance take the unit of analysis as exogenous and study
the extent of insurance at the level of the village or even larger groups. Second, a higher need for
insurance, stemming for instance from a higher degree of risk aversion, relaxes the enforcement
constraint and must therefore increase the extent of risk-sharing within a community.
1.2. Groups in Risk-Sharing. Our starting point is the following natural observation: If a
large group – say, the village community or a particular caste or kin group within the community
– can foresee the beneﬁts of risk-sharing and reach an agreement, why can’t smaller groups do
the same? Indeed, one may go a step further and entertain the possibility that subgroups may
agree to jointly defect and subsequently share risk among themselves. It follows that, to be
truly self-enforcing, an informal risk-sharing agreement should be robust to joint deviations by
subgroups.
At the same time, such group deviations must be themselves credible. To be of any value,
or to pose a credible threat to the group at large, a deviating coalition should also employ self-
enforcing arrangements. These embedded constraints characterize the concepts of self-enforcing
risk-sharing agreements and stable coalitions that we deﬁne in Genicot and Ray (2003). We
study group formation in informal insurance within communities, recognizing that not just the
1In the words of Telser (1980, p.27), “In a self-enforcing agreement each party decides unilaterally whether he is
better oﬀ continuing or stopping his relation with the other parties”.
2Of course, considerations of asymmetric information or some other cost of group formation may close oﬀ group
size before the community limit is reached. See below for further discussion of this point.4 CONTENTS
extent of insurance within a given group is endogenous, but that this aﬀects and is aﬀected by
the process of group formation itself.
This has two important implications that sharply contrast with the individual-deviation
model. First, subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger
group, thereby limiting group size. Second, an increase in the need for insurance — stemming
either from a change in the environment or in some behavioral parameter, such as the degree
of risk aversion — can actually decrease the extent of risk-sharing among the population, by
reducing the maximal stable group size.
Indeed, the few papers that address the issue of risk-sharing among subgroups actually ﬁnd
convincing evidence for the existence of subgroups. Lomnitz [1977] ﬁnds that reciprocity networks
in Cerrada del C´ ondor, a shanty-town of about 200 dwellings in the southern sector of Mexico
City, are composed of an average of 3.65 nuclear families. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) address
a similar question in the context of the rural Philippines. While gifts and loans circulate among
networks of friends and relatives, risk is far from eﬃciently shared at the village level. Likewise,
Murgai, Winters, Sadoulet and DeJanvry (2002) investigate water transfers among households
along a watercourse in Pakistan’s Punjab and ﬁnd that reciprocal exchanges are localized in units
smaller than the entire watercourse community.
To be sure, there are other potential explanations for observed limits on group size. Ge-
ographical proximity (or lack thereof), the limited observability of actions or types, a varying
ability to punish slackers, or positive covariance in the income distribution: all these factors can
explain diﬀerences in the extent of insurance, with some clusters of individuals making more
transfers to each other than to others. However, except in extreme cases, all agents would be
expected to transact with each other directly or indirectly, at least to some extent. Murgai et
al. suggest that the explanation for the formation of these subgroups must lie in the existence of
setup costs that with the number of participants in the risk-sharing agreement: “If establishing
and maintaining partnerships is indeed costless, there is no reason for a mutual insurance group
not to be community-wide or world-wide. Real world limits to group size must therefore be the
result of costs relating to the formation and maintenance of partnerships” (Murgai et al. (2002),2. GROUP FORMATION UNDER EQUAL SHARING 5
p.251). However, this paper suggests that there may be more fundamental reasons for group
splintering.
1.3. Outline of Paper. In what follows, we illustrate the group formation question by
means of the simplest possible model (Section 2). In this setup, a group that forms must insure
each other to the maximal extent possible (we call this the equal sharing norm). Adherence to
such a norm at the group level does not, of course, do away with the enforcement constraint.
Splinter subgroups (conceivably individuals but often nondegenerate groups) may well break oﬀ
from the larger group. Subsequently they, too, must follow the equal-sharing group, and their
stability will be tested in exactly the same way.
In Section 3, we extend the model to allow for the recognition (by a group) that it may be
constantly under threat from potential deviants. Such recognition will generally entail a departure
from equal sharing, with more limited transfers. To be sure, in the interests of consistency, we
must permit a similar self-exploration on the part of deviant subgroups. Thus, as we expand the
possibilities for the group as a whole, we also expand the range of threats to its stability. Finally,
in Section 4, we comment on a further widening of insurance schemes to include history-dependent
quasi-credit.
The emphasis throughout this paper is on speciﬁc examples rather than on full generality.
Readers invited in the details of a more general analysis are invited to consult Genicot and Ray
(2003).
2. Group Formation Under Equal Sharing
A community of n identical agents engages in the production and consumption of a perishable
good at each date. Each agent produces a random income that is high h with probability p and
low ` with probability 1 − p. Income realizations are independent and identical, over people as
well as dates. Each agent has the same utility function, increasing, smooth and strictly concave
in consumption. They discount future at a rate δ ∈ (0,1).
Consider any grouping of individuals in this community, and suppose that its members are
currently pledged to mutually insure one another against consumption ﬂuctuations. We assume
that such insurance is to the maximum extent possible: group output is shared equally among all6 CONTENTS
the members. We refer to this practice as equal sharing. [It is obvious that this is the ﬁrst-best
symmetric scheme.]
Let e v(n) denote the expected utility from the equal sharing scheme. When k individuals
draw h, all group members consume k
nh + n−k
n `. This implies a per-period expected utility of










where p(k,n) is just the probability of k highs out of n draws.3
Equal-sharing stability may be deﬁned recursively as follows. By deﬁnition, singletons or
individuals are equal-sharing stable and the worth of a singleton group is just ˜ v(1). Recursively,
having assessed equal-sharing stability for all m = 1,...,n − 1, a coalition of size n is said to be
equal-sharing stable if, for all k = 1,...,n − 1,











≤ δ (˜ v(n) − ˜ v(s))
for every equal-sharing stable s ≤ k. This constraint requires that the short term deviation
gain from not making the transfer, on the left-hand-side, be smaller than the long term gain
from remaining in the risk sharing agreement rather than deviating in a group of size s, on the
right-hand-side. If n is equal-sharing stable then its worth is simply ˜ v(n). Note that for a given
equal-sharing stable size s it actually suﬃces to check the constraint for k = s since the left-hand
side is decreasing in k.
Proposition 1. Independently of the overall community size, there is a ﬁnite upper bound
on the equal-sharing stable sizes.
It is easy to see why (see formal proof in appendix). If the assertion were false, there would
be an inﬁnity of stable sizes. But we do know that the marginal “diversiﬁcation gain” from an
increase in size ultimately tends to zero. Therefore, for a very small , we may pick a stable size
n such that a coalition of size n is able to reap most of the beneﬁts of sharing risk: a larger
stable group improves the per-capita utility of its members by no more than . Because the set
3That is, p(k,n) = n!
k!(n−k)!pk(1 − p)n−k.2. GROUP FORMATION UNDER EQUAL SHARING 7
of stable sizes is inﬁnite, we can choose a stable coalition suﬃciently larger than n such that the
short term gain of deviating from this coalition when n agents have a good shock is strictly larger
than the relative long term gain from being in this larger coalition rather than in a group of n.
Moreover, it is possible to show that for a large range of preferences the set of equal-sharing
stable sizes is a “connected” set of integers. To identify this range, consider the following condi-
tion:
[QC] For every k, (1 − δ)u( k
nh + n−k
n `) + δe v(n) is quasi-concave in n for all n ≥ k.
Condition [QC] is satisﬁed for several utility functions. It is true, for instance, for all util-
ity functions exhibiting a relative risk aversion of at least 2, as well as for quadratic or cubic
preferences. Now we may state the following proposition (see appendix for proof):
Proposition 2. For all utility functions satisfying [QC], if a group of size n is not equal-
sharing stable then a group of size n0 > n is not equal-sharing stable either.
For instance, with a utility function given by u(x) = −1
2(B−x)2 for some B > h it is possible











where C = δ
1−δp(1−p) and θ = h−`
B−h (this latter variable will later reappear as our proxy for the
need for insurance).
From the inequalities (0.3), it is easy to see that for the same k and n a mean preserving
spread in the income distribution (higher θ) and a higher patience δ relax the constraints. Hence,
these increase (or at least leave unchanged) the set of equal-sharing stable sizes. Similarly, higher
values of p(1 − p) (p closer to 1/2) correspond to a higher variance and therefore, if anything,
increase the set of stable sizes.
Condition (0.3) may also be used to obtain a tighter description of the maximal equal-sharing
stable group. We illustrate this by neglecting integer constraints (which are easily accounted for).
Observe that the left-hand side of (0.3) is minimized (in k) when k =
√
nC, this condition being8 CONTENTS
applicable when n > C. Solving for the minimum value, we see that the maximal group size M
is bounded above by the inequality





Notice that M is bounded uniformly in θ. With our later interpretation of θ as a measure of the
need for insurance, this means that maximal stable size cannot rise indeﬁnitely in need.
3. Stationary Transfers
To be sure, even when an equal-sharing agreement is not possible, individuals may be able
to design a risk-sharing agreement by limiting transfers in states for which the enforcement
constraint is binding. Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993) study the best stationary
risk-sharing agreements. In this section, we emulate the approach of these authors to ﬁnd the
best constrained risk-sharing agreement. At the same time, we also bear in mind that groups as
well as individuals may deviate. In short, we develop the theory of group enforcement constraints
under the assumption that each coalition or group, once formed, attempts to implement some
symmetric and stationary risk-sharing arrangement.
As in the previous section, group stability is deﬁned recursively. Once again, individuals (or
singleton coalitions) are stable. The lifetime utility of an individual in isolation (normalized by
the discount factor to a per-period equivalent) is simply
v∗(1) ≡ pu(h) + (1 − p)u(`).
This is the stable worth of a “singleton group”.
Recursively, having deﬁned stability (and stable worths) for all m = 1,...,n − 1, consider
some coalition of size n. We ﬁrst deﬁne a (symmetric and stationary) transfer scheme. This
may be written as a vector t ≡ (t1,...,tn−1), where tk is to be interpreted as the (nonnegative)
transfer or payment by a person in the event that his income is h and k individuals draw h. We
only consider nontrivial schemes in which tk > 0 for some k.
With a transfer scheme in mind we can easily back out what a person receives if his income
draw is ` and k individuals produce h. The total transfer is then ktk, to be divided equally among3. STATIONARY TRANSFERS 9
the n−k individuals who produce l. Thus a transfer scheme t implies the following: if there are
k high draws, then a person consumes h − tk if he produces h, and ` + ktk
n−k if he produces `. It
follows that the expected utility from a transfer scheme t is given by

















where p(k,n) — as before — is the probability of k highs out of n draws. Deﬁne a (nontrivial)
transfer scheme t to be stable if for all k = 1,...,n − 1,
(0.6) (1 − δ)u(h − tk) + δv(t,n) ≥ (1 − δ)u(h) + δv∗(s)
for every stable s ≤ k.
The interpretation of stability is quite simple. We require that for all possible income real-
izations, the stipulated transfers actually be carried out. If inequality (0.6) fails for some k and
s ≤ k, this means that there is a stable coalition of size s that would rather refuse to pay what
they are required to pay (when k individuals draw high) and share risk with each other such that
this transfer would actually not be made.
It is useful to compare our deﬁnition of self-enforcing insurance with the one used in the
literature in which only the individual enforcement constraint must be respected. We shall call
this individual stability, or i-stability for short. Fix a population of n individuals, and let b v(n)
denote the maximum value of (0.5) when (0.6) is only invoked for s = 1. In other words, b v(n) is





(0.8) (1 − δ)u(h − tk) + δv(t,n) ≥ (1 − δ)u(h) + δv∗(1)
for all k = 1,...,n − 1.
If there is some nontrivial transfer scheme that solves this problem, say that a group of size n is
i-stable.10 CONTENTS
In what follows, we will show that the concepts of stability and i-stability have very diﬀerent
implications for the extent of insurance that we expect a community to achieve. For this purpose,




u0(h) , which we henceforth
denote by θ. [The reader can check that this deﬁnition reduces precisely to the corresponding θ in
the example of the previous section.] Keeping everything else constant, a mean preserving spread
between h and ` increases θ. Moreover, for the same income distribution, a utility function
that exhibits a higher risk aversion throughout its domain will translate into a higher need
for insurance. Hence, our measure incorporates both environmental uncertainty and attitudes
towards risk, albeit in summary form.
We now proceed in further characterizing the sets of i-stable and stable sizes.
First, notice that if a group is not i-stable it cannot be stable since stability only adds
constraints to the problem. Hence, the set of stable size is included in the set of i-stable sizes.
Next, note from inequality (0.8) that for the same transfer to be made today, and therefore
the same short-term gain from deviating, being in a larger group means larger long-term beneﬁts.
This implies that if a group size is i-stable, any larger size must be stable too. In particular, in




Clearly, the right-hand-side of (0.9) is decreasing in n and bounded below by θ ≡ 1−δ
δp . It
follows that, if the need for insurance θ is no larger than θ, there is no i-stable or stable risk-
sharing agreement and only autarky is possible. In contrast, if θ > θ not only is the set of i-stable
sizes non-empty but it is inﬁnite. The smallest i-stable group size is the smallest value of n such
that (0.9) holds and any larger size is i-stable too.
Now suppose that θ > θ. What can we say about the set of stable sizes? Consider the smallest
i-stable size. Since no smaller size is stable, no deviations other than individual deviations are
credible. Hence, the same risk-sharing agreement is stable and this group size is also the smallest
stable group size. With larger group sizes, however, this argument breaks down. Once groups
of intermediate size are stable, they begin to pose credible threats to groups of larger size, and
i-stability no longer implies stability.3. STATIONARY TRANSFERS 11
This raises the question of whether there can be an inﬁnite number of stable groups. Propo-
sition 1 suggests the answer is no, but because we are no longer restricted to the equal-sharing
norm the argument here is more subtle. In Genicot and Ray (2003) we show that, indeed, only
a ﬁnite number of sizes can be stable and therefore that the set of stable sizes has a ﬁnite upper
bound. To see why this must be true assume as earlier than the assertion is false and therefore
that there is an inﬁnity of stable sizes. As before, we can then pick a stable size n such that
a coalition of size n is able to reap most of the beneﬁts of sharing risk: a larger stable group
improves the per-capita utility of its members by only a small amount. The diﬀerence with equal-
sharing stability is that now one can limit the transfer to satisfy the enforcement constraints.
This means that in any larger stable coalition, the transfers made whenever at least n people have
a good shock have to be close to 0. But, because the set of stable sizes is inﬁnite, we can choose
this stable coalition suﬃciently large such that the probability of at least n people having a good
shock is close to 1. This implies that the worth of such a coalition can be brought arbitrarily
close to autarkic utility, but this contradicts the presumed stability of that coalition.
The above ﬁndings are summarized in the following proposition (proof omitted) and illus-
trated in Figure 0.1.
Proposition 3. [Genicot and Ray (2003)] For each level of need for insurance θ > 1−δ
δp ,
there are thresholds ¯ n(θ) and n(θ) such that
(0.10) 2 ≤ n(θ) ≤ n ≤ ¯ n(θ) < ∞,
for every stable group size n. Moreover,




In addition, from Proposition 3 follows a general “nonmonotonicity” result: a higher need for
insurance can actually translate into lower group sizes. This can been seen directly from Figure
0.1. Pick a community size ˜ n that lies above the “stable correspondence” at some point. Then
for any n ≥ ˜ n, we can ﬁnd two degrees of uncertainty θ1 and θ2, with θ2 > θ1, such that n is12 CONTENTS
Figure 0.1. An Illustration of Proposition 3.
stable under θ1 but not under θ2. It is easy enough to pick θ1 to be such that n is the smallest
stable size that can be supported under θ1, and pick θ2 such that the largest stable size under θ2
is strictly less than falls below n. Hence, the non-monotonicity.
The following example from Genicot and Ray (2003) illustrates well the main features of our
concept of stability.






where ρ is the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Assume the following values for
the speciﬁc parameters: δ = 0.83, ρ = 1.6, p = 0.4, ` = 2, and h = 3.
We evaluate — for each group size ranging from 1 to 10 — the return to informal insurance.
One natural way to do this is to look at the gain over and above autarky, compared to the
corresponding per-capita gain that the ﬁrst-best provides in the community of all ten. If ˜ v
denotes this latter value and ˆ v(n) is the i-stable value for a group of size n, then the i-stable gain3. STATIONARY TRANSFERS 13










4 × 61 ∅
5 × 69 ∅
6 × 75 ∅
7 × 78 ∅
8 × 81 ∅
9 × 84 ∅
10 × 85 ∅
Table 0.1. Stable Gains are Limited.
may be reported as
ˆ v(n) − v(1)
˜ v − v(1)
× 100
in percentage terms. Similarly, if v∗(n) is the stable value for a group of size n, then the stable
gain is described as
v∗(n) − v(1)
˜ v − v(1)
× 100,
again in percentage terms. The results for this example are reported in Table 0.1.
It turns out that within this population of 10 and for the parameter values described, only
individuals and groups of size 2 and 3 are stable. The question arise then: which groups do we
expect to see and if there are groups of diﬀerent sizes which payoﬀs do we look at? Since we are
looking at constrained eﬃcient schemes among identical agents, a good contender is the partition
of the population into stable groups that maximizes the expected utility of an agent, under the
assumption that his probability to be in any given group is proportional to the size of the group.
In this example, this rule predicts that the population would break into three stable groups of
three individuals each and one singleton group (which means a 90% chance of getting v∗(3) and
a 10% chance of obtaining v(1)). That is, an individual’s stable payoﬀ gain is 38% (see Table
0.1) with probability 9/10 and 0 otherwise. This implies a stable gain of only 34% which is less
than half the return (85%) were we not to account for coalition formation.
One might object that Example 2 is only described for a very special set of parameter values.
So, to build Table 0.2 we took similar parameters but consider diﬀerent values for the probability14 CONTENTS
p\θ .75 1 2
.2 1 1 1,2
.4 1,3 1,2 1,2
.6 1,3 1,2,5 1,2
.8 1,3,5 1,3 1,2,7
Table 0.2. Stable Sizes
of a high income p and for the need for insurance θ. Table 0.2 reports the stable group sizes for
the diﬀerent values of p and θ.
To summarize the discussion so far, we see that
(1) The stability of smaller sizes may impede the stability of larger sizes.
(2) Much has been written on “social capital” in the past few years. In the insurance context one
could measure the return to such capital very much as we have done here. However, recognizing
the possibility of coalition deviations dramatically reduces the estimated return on social capital.
(3) Computations for several parameter values reveal both robustness and sensitivity, in the
following senses. Changing the parameters even slightly causes some stable sizes to become
unstable and vice versa as Table 0.2 illustrates. Yet the results are surprisingly robust in the
sense that potential coalitional deviations inevitably cause a large fraction of the potential beneﬁts
from insurance not to be reaped.
(4) Moreover, at p = 0.4 if the need for insurance θ increases from 0.75 to 1 the largest stable size
decreases from 3 to 2. This suggests that even an increase in risk may destroy previously successful
insurance arrangements as previously non-viable subgroups now become viable, destroying the
viability of the larger community.
One can extend this analysis to heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity is a natural feature of
life and is likely to play an important role in group formation. Kinship, family, clan and religious
aﬃliation are important in this respect, because they help in punishing and imposing strict
norms on members (Platteau (1991) and Fafchamps (1992)). At the same time, characteristics
that strengthen risk sharing between some individuals will tend to worsen the performance of4. GENERAL RESULTS: ASYMMETRIC TREATMENT AND HISTORY DEPENDENCE 15
risk-sharing agreements within a larger group or even destroy altogether the stability of these
larger groups.
We illustrate this with a simple example. Consider two households each composed of two
members. We shall assume that households have means of punishing their own members who
would defect from a risk-sharing agreement but not individuals outside their households. Assume
logarithmic utility and the following values for the parameters: ` = 1, h = 1.488, p = 0.5 and
δ = 0.9. The appendix shows that, in this case, the ability of individuals to perfectly share risk
within their household prevents them from sharing risk across households. Indeed, no stationary
insurance agreement can be designed involving positive transfer between the two households. As
a result, individuals enjoy a utility of e v(2) per period. However, in the absence of any enforcement
power within households, these individuals would be able to all share risk with each other and
enjoy v∗(4). This, although still imperfect, would represent a 16% increase in the gain from
insurance! 4
4. General Results: Asymmetric Treatment and History Dependence
The last section went a long way towards endogenizing both group formation and risk-sharing
agreements. However, the latter were restricted to be symmetric and stationary. In this section,
we explain why risk-sharing agreements will generally make use of history dependence and of
asymmetric strategies in subgames, and discuss the robustness of our results.
The reader familiar with the recent literature on insurance knows that when the lack of
enforcement limits risk-sharing the optimal i-stable risk-sharing agreement is non-stationary.
The reason is simple. With stationary transfers, all agents face the same continuation utility
regardless of their current shock. However, when perfect risk-sharing is not possible, an agent
suﬀering from a low shock today has a higher marginal utility than an agent with a high income.
It follows that there exists a mutually beneﬁcial modiﬁcation in the agreement in which the low-
income agent trades oﬀ some of his continuation utility in exchange for a slightly higher transfer
today. The low-income agent promises to make some transfer (within the self-enforcing range)
to the high-income agent in the event that both of them draw a high or a low shock next period.
4The gain is evaluated as
v∗(4)−e v(2)
e v(4)−v(1) × 100.16 CONTENTS
Thus the eﬃcient scheme tends to equalize the inter-temporal rates of substitution between the
agents. As Kocherlakota (1996) showed, all the history dependence of the optimal i-stable risk-
sharing agreement is captured in the ratios of marginal utility of the agents. Given last period’s
ratio of marginal utilities, the continuation expected utilities of the agents follows a stationary
distribution. Because the ratio of marginal utilities is one possible measure of the agents’ relative
needs, the structure of history-dependent schemes ﬁts the empirical evidence well.
Numerous studies in the economic and anthropological literature provide evidence that in-
formal risk-sharing agreements and informal credit arrangements are not clearly separated (see,
for instance, Evans-Pritchard (1940), Platteau and Abraham (1987) and Udry (1994)). These
studies report a large reliance on what is observationally equivalent to informal loans with an
implicit repayment scheme contingent on the lender’s needs and the borrower’s ability to repay.
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Fafchamps and Lund
(2001) all ﬁnd that the history-dependent scheme ﬁts the data better than the benchmark of
perfect risk-pooling and the stationary limited commitment model.
Now, a particular source of history-dependence and asymmetry stems speciﬁcally from our
consideration of group formation. When group deviations are important, symmetry necessitates
that we compensate all potential deviants in a subgroup in order to prevent a deviation. If
that symmetry is broken, then not all deviants need to be so treated. A subset, containing the
minimal number that must be compensated in order to avoid the deviation, will suﬃce. For
instance, to prevent two individuals from deviating, the scheme may require a suﬃciently low
transfer from one of them so that he would not participate in a joint deviation, while demanding
from the other a higher transfer (but not too high, so that individual deviations are still not
worthwhile). This will be the case even if both agents experienced the same history of shocks.
Clearly, randomization will play an important role in this case to decide who gets to make the
lower transfer. [Randomization would retain symmetry ex ante.]
With these asymmetries, it is no longer necessary to compensate every member of every po-
tential subgroup; it is only necessary to compensate some member of every potential subgroup.
In contrast, in a symmetric and stationary equilibrium, every member of a potentially deviant4. GENERAL RESULTS: ASYMMETRIC TREATMENT AND HISTORY DEPENDENCE 17
subgroup must be simultaneously compensated for staying with the ambient group. Such com-
pensations become impossible because the marginal gains to group size vanish, whereas deviation
gains are bounded away from zero, precipitating the boundedness result in the stationary case. In
the general case, it is possible to switch carefully to asymmetric strategies following appropriate
histories of good and bad draws.
To allow for history-dependence, asymmetries, as well as randomization, insurance schemes
need to be redeﬁned. For a group of size n, let y be a vector of realized incomes; that is, yi is
either h or ` for each i = 1,...,n. Let c be a nonnegative vector of consumptions. Say that c is




i yi. For any date s, an s-history — call it Hs — is a list of all
past income realizations and (feasible) consumption vectors. [At s = 0, simply use any singleton
to denote the 0-history.]
Deﬁne M(y) to be the set of all probability measures over consumption vectors c such that c
is feasible for y. An insurance arrangement is a list of functions σ = {σs}∞
s=0 such that for all
s ≥ 0, σs maps the product of s-histories and current income realizations y to lotteries in M(y).
We’ll say that an insurance arrangement is nontrivial if it places positive probability on schemes
that involve nonzero transfers for some states.
Note that an insurance arrangement generates a vector of expected payoﬀs following every s-
history Hs: call this vector v(Hs,σ,n). [These are discounted normalized expected payoﬀs
for each individual in the group, before the realization of current incomes and, of course, the
consumption lottery.]
To deﬁne stability, we proceed recursively just as in the stationary case. Individuals (or
singleton coalitions) are automatically branded stable. Indeed, there is only one stable payoﬀ
for an “individual coalition”, which is just the no-insurance payoﬀ at every date. That is, if we
deﬁne
(0.12) v∗(1) ≡ pu(h) + (1 − p)u(`),
then the set of stable payoﬀs is just V ∗(1) ≡ {v∗(1)}.18 CONTENTS
Now suppose that we have deﬁned stable payoﬀ sets V ∗(m) for all m = 1,...,n−1 (some of
these may be empty). Pick a group of size n and a nontrivial insurance arrangement σ for this
group. Say that σ is stable if the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
[Participation.] For no s-history Hs is there a subgroup of individuals (of size m < n) and a
stable payoﬀ vector v ∈ V ∗(m) such that vi(Hs,σ,n) < vi for all i = 1,...,m.
[Enforcement.] The following is a zero-probability event under σ: there is an s-history Hs, an
income realization y, and a prescribed consumption allocation c such that for some subgroup of
individuals (of size m < n) and some stable payoﬀ vector v ∈ V ∗(m),
(0.13) (1 − δ)u(yi) + δvi > (1 − δ)u(ci) + δvi(Hs+1,σ,n),
where Hs+1 is the (s + 1)-history obtained by concatenating Hs with y and c.
If σ is stable, then say that v(h0,σ,n) is a stable payoﬀ vector for n. If no such vector exists, we
say that n is unstable and set V ∗(n) to the empty set.
In Genicot and Ray (2003) we show that our main result extends to this fully general case.
For every value of θ such that some stable group exists, the maximal stable group size is ﬁnite.
5. Some Final Remarks
We end with two remarks, one methodological and one speciﬁc to the study of insurance
arrangements.
The reader familiar with the recent literature on endogenous coalition formation (see, e.g.,
Bloch (1996), and Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999, 2001)) will see the close parallel to our approach.
However, there is one important diﬀerence. In the literature on endogenous coalition formation,
coalitions respond to a proposed ex ante arrangement. That is, coalitional constraints are evalu-
ated at the level of the “participation constraints”. In contrast, in this paper, coalitions respond
after learning the realization of income shocks at every date, and after learning what their actions
are to be. These ex-post considerations are closer to “incentive constraints.” In this sense, our
approach also bears a connection to the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and
Whinston (1987)).5. SOME FINAL REMARKS 19
Moreover, the existence of an upper bound on stable groups is in stark contrast with the
existence of inﬁnitely many stable sizes in the coalition formation literature (see, e.g., Bloch
(1996) and Ray and Vohra (1997) for results on stable cartels in oligopoly, and Ray and Vohra
(2001) for results on the eﬃcient provision of public goods). It is is peculiar to the insurance
problem.20 CONTENTS
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that Proposition 1 is false. Then there exists an inﬁnite set
N such that for all n ∈ N, n is stable. Since e v(n) is increasing, if n and n0 are both in N and
n < n0, then e v(n) ≤ e v(n0). Moreover, {e v(n)}n∈N is bounded. It follows that for any  > 0, there
exists n() ∈ N such that for all n ∈ N with n > n(),
(0.14) e v(n) − e v(n()) < .




[u(h) − u(`)] − A,
for some A > 0. Now consider some stable n > n(). It is obvious that as n → ∞,









→ u(h) − u(`).










> e v(n) − e v(n())
which contradicts the stability of n.
Proof of Proposition 2. For any k and any n ≥ k, deﬁne











+ δ (˜ v(n) − ˜ v(k))
Invoking [QC], it is easy to see that I(k,n) must be quasi-concave in n. Because I(k,k) = 0, the
quasi-concavity of I(k,n) implies that if I(k,n) < 0 for any n > k, then the same must be true
of any n0 > n.
Details of the ﬁnal example in Section 3. Within a household, perfect risk-sharing can be
achieved. This implies that in the absence of any transfers across household-pairs, a household’s
member income eﬀectively takes on three values h, ` and m = h+`
2 with probability ph = p2,24 CONTENTS
p` = (1 − p)2 and pm = 2p(1 − p). So a typical household enjoys utility
(0.18) e v(2) = phu(h) + pmu(m) + p`u(`).









Let ` = 1, h = 1.488, p = 0.5, δ = 0.9, n = 4 and assume a log utility. It can be checked that




e v(4)−v(1) × 100

. Moreover, in the absence of better enforcement power within




e v(4)−v(1) × 100

of 72%. Hence, this implies an additional gain of 16%.